One always has to wonder something after reading an article like the one Madeleine List wrote about legislation to force landlords to take government housing vouchers and to block their ability to find out if potential tenants have appeared in housing court before. Was the reporter absolutely unable to find anybody to offer a contrary view?
The first argument one hears as an opposing view is that tenants who aren’t paying their own rent might not feel as inclined to keep it up or stay on good terms with their landlords. Although this might be a reasonable concern, in some cases, it may be more of a strawman, because it isn’t the best of the three most-obvious answers.
The most practical of the other two answers is that Section 8 isn’t simply a source of income. Accepting Section 8 vouchers requires the landlord to accept regular government inspections and other impositions. Even if we take as a given that the government will never make inspections more burdensome than the most basic health and safety concerns that all landlords should cover voluntarily, many may simply not want to deal with that extra layer of bureaucracy.
The third obvious answer is that accepting low-income tenants comes with some risk, whether the risk is that they won’t treat the property well, that they’re on the bordeline of being able to afford the rent at all, or that the government might decide that its vouchers give it more authority over your property than was initially the case. And risk comes with a cost.
This gets to a point about unintended consequences that legislators really should keep in mind at all times. Imposing risk effectively raises the cost of being a landlord, either by imposing an cost in stress or by forcing them to raise rates or lower profits in order to compensate when the risk goes bad.
Raise the cost of rentals, and we’ll have fewer. Have fewer rentals, and the natural price of the market will go up. Raise that price, and we’ll have fewer rentals. Rinse. Repeat. Housing crisis.